Who blows the whistle — a loner or a well-liked team player? Which of them is more likely to lead a successful opposition to perceived organizational wrongdoing? The potential influence of co-worker pressures to conform on whistle-blowing activity or the likely effects of whistle-blowing on the group have not been addressed. This paper presents a preliminary model of whistle-blowing as an act of nonconformity. One implication is that the success of an opposition will depend on the characteristics of the whistle-blower (...) and how the complaint is pursued. Specific hypotheses and general suggestions for future research and practice are offered. (shrink)

This major intellectual response to the leading theologian of liberal Judaism provides a significant indication of future directions in Jewish religious thought.

Drawing on a broad range of case studies, the contributors to Terrestrial Transformations explore the political and economic forces entangled in environmental and ecological problems and look at humanity's future in light of climate change and existing environmental problems.

Scholars from both disciplinary and interdisciplinary formations will discover the need to consult and use this volume.

Una visión de la película de Lars Von Trier: Anticristo.

This paper aims to explore the association between over-indebtedness and two facets of well-being – life satisfaction and emotional well-being. Although prior research has associated over-indebtedness with lower life satisfaction, this study contributes to the extant literature by revealing its effects on emotional well-being, which is a crucial component of well-being that has received less attention. Besides subjective well-being, reported health, and sleep quality were also assessed. The findings suggest that over-indebted consumers have lower life satisfaction and emotional well-being, as (...) well as poorer health and sleep quality. Furthermore, over-indebtedness impacts life satisfaction and emotional well-being through different mechanisms. Consumers decreased perceived control accounts for the impact of over-indebtedness on both facets of well-being. Financial well-being, partly mediates the impact of indebtedness status on overall life satisfaction. The current study contributes to research focusing on the relationship between indebtedness, well-being, health, and sleep quality, and provides relevant theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further (...) questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined. (shrink)

The Sacks Density Theorem [7] states that the Turing degrees of the recursively enumerable sets are dense. We show that the Density Theorem holds in every model of P - + BΣ 2 . The proof has two components: a lemma that in any model of P - + BΣ 2 , if B is recursively enumerable and incomplete then IΣ 1 holds relative to B and an adaptation of Shore's [9] blocking technique in α-recursion theory to models of arithmetic.

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

This paper examines two realisations of the television talk show in North America: The Oprah Winfrey Show and Dr. Phil, looking specifically at how they function within the sub-genre of ‘therapeutic talk show’ in keeping with Livingstone and Lunt’s (1994) classification of talk shows. Talk shows are defined by Ilie (2001) as “semi-institutional discourse” having features of a given setting (TV studio), topic- and goal-oriented talk, high degree of topic control, as well as restrictions on time and turn-taking. Theorists examining (...) this sub-genre of therapeutic talk show have argued that it provides a valuable means by which stories otherwise unrecognized have a forum, or that values of truth and honesty can be conveyed (Livingstone & Lunt 1994; Masciarotte 1991; Carbaugh 1988). However, theorists such as Abt and Seesholtz (1994) view therapeutic talk shows as potentially demeaning to guests who appear on them as well as a means by which suffering can be trivialized. Through an examination and analysis of requests for information, both direct and indirect, which are the principal features of all interviews, I look at how Oprah Winfrey and Dr. Phil problematize the narratives told by their guests. Both hosts rely heavily on one type of request, B-Event assertions functioning as indirect requests for information, to provoke specific response. My findings indicate that these talk shows do not in fact provide a forum for talk that would otherwise not be considered as suggested by Livingstone and Lunt (1994). Both Oprah Winfrey and Dr. Phil appropriate the stories provided by their guests; they also participate in their own overarching meta-narrative whereby as ‘heroes’ they solve their guests’ problems within a given time frame. Guests’ narrative responses share more with the speech act of confession than with free self-expression. The speech act of confession encouraged by these therapeutic talk shows serves in turn to reinforce conservatively-held values on the part of the at-home audience for whom such confession is also entertainment. (shrink)

Mein Beitrag untersucht die folgende Fragestellung: „Kann S gerechtfertigt sein, X zu tun, wobei es erlaubt ist, X zu tun, wenn die Bedingungen B vorliegen, wenn S fälschlich, aber vernünftigerweise glaubt, dass die Bedingungen B vorliegen?“ Ich plädiere für eine Bejahung dieser Frage, und zwar im Gegensatz zu der von Joachim Hruschka in seinem Aufsatz „Justifications and Excuses: A Sy-stematic Approach“ vertretenen Posi-tion. Ich bin der Auffassung, daß eine Rechtfertigung eine vernünftige Annahme voraussetzt; es ist nicht notwendig, daß diese Annahme (...) auch zutrifft. Dass S vernünftigerweise glaubt, daß p, während in Wirklichkeit p nicht vorliegt, scheint jedenfalls kein entschuldigender Umstand zu sein. Diese Situation ist vielmehr wesentlich unterschieden von krankheitsbedingter Zurechnungsunfähigkeit oder sonst verminderter geistiger Fähigkeit. Es ist daher wichtig, zwischen zwei Arten von Gründen zu unterscheiden, die dazu führen, daß eine Person nicht verantwortlich gemacht wird für X, obwohl sie X getan hat; und zwar sind dies einerseits Gründe, die im Hinblick auf Probleme der handelnden Person selbst entschuldigend wirken, und andererseits solche Gründe, die weder einen Mangel noch Verwirrung der handelnden Person selbst reflektieren, noch einen Fehler in dem Entscheidungsprozeß, der zu der Handlung geführt hat. My essay addresses the following question: "Can S be justified in doing X, where it is permissible to do X when conditions C obtain, if S mistakenly but reasonably believes that conditions C do obtain?" I defend an affirmative reply, contrary to the position taken by Prof. Hruschka in his "Justifications and Excuses: A Systematic Approach" . I understand justification as requiring reasonable belief; it is not necessary that the belief be true. That S believes on reasonable grounds that p when in fact p is false seems not to be an excusing condition. It is importantly different from insanity, or diminished capacity. I stress the importance of differentiating between two very different kinds of reasons for holding someone not to be culpable for X despite having done X, viz, reasons that exculpate due to problems with the agent himself and those that do not reflect any deficiency or disorder in the agent, or any flaw in the process by which she chose as she did. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:25 MORALITY AS A BACK-UP SYSTEM: HUME'S VIEW? The sense of duty is a useful device for helping men to do what a really good man would do without a sense of duty..... Nowell-Smith A certain picture of morality — arguably a Humean one — has come to have a prominent place in contemporary philosophy. On this picture, morality, as Richard Brandt asserts, is "a back-up system, which operates (...) when spontaneous personal caring fails 2 to motivate us to do as we ought." Morality — at least in the form of moral principles, whose force is felt through one's sense of duty — is, on this view, ideally superfluous. As a guide for one's own conduct it is needed only insofar as the agent's affective network is deficient. If one only spontaneously desired a, cared about b, cared for c, felt aversion towards d as, ideally, one should, moral principles and a sense of duty would be of no use. There are good reasons for supposing that this is Hume's view. After all, his characterization of acting from duty is more than a little disparaging: When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself,,as much as possible, his want of it. I will argue, however, that there is tension in Hume's ethics between two lines of thought. According to the first line of thought, and the one 26 usually associated with Hume, good conduct is conduct which is spontaneously prompted by virtuous desires. Unless our desires either are not what they should be or are motivationally weak, there is no need for mediation or tempering by a sense of duty or moral principles. According to the second line, the very good desires of a very good person may nonetheless need to be filtered, tempered, redirected or checked. This line is most evident in "Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices." Before arguing that these strains of thought are in tension in Hume's ethics, I need to clarify what is at issue and to develop the two competing pictures of moral motivation. First the issue. The issue is not 'Who is better: someone with a sense of duty but corrupt desires or someone with no sense of duty but ideal desires?' Nor is the issue one of the moral worth of actions ('Can an action have moral worth if it is not performed out of duty?') The issue, rather, is how to characterize morally good (or right) conduct. What role, if any, does a sense of duty or a Butlerian principle of reflection, i.e., an overarching, guiding conception of what is right or good which is 'juridically' supreme within the self, play in good conduct? Is morally good conduct ideally a matter of acting as one should from the proper desires? Or should the desires be governed and guided by moral principles? Consider two models of moral conduct. Model I: Morality as a Back-Up System On this picture, wrongness in conduct is traceable to an affective deficiency. The claim underlying this picture seems to be as follows: One 27 acts wrongly because one's passions are not quite what they should be. One person cheats in her business dealings because she cares too little about the welfare of others (and too much about her own); another is harsh and abrupt to a student because he cares too little about his students' concerns and is jealous and possessive when it comes to 'his time.' In each case the problem can be traced to an affective deficiency. Hume appears to be supporting this view when he asserts, "it may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no act can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of its morality' (T 479). A few pages later he writes, "[E]very immorality... (shrink)

The present article attempts to evaluate various tenets of moral philosophy by reviewing empirical data from the field of organizational justice bearing on: (a) people''s concerns about fairness in organizations, and (b) the consequences of following or not following rules of justice. With respect to concerns about fairness in organizations, utilitarian claims that people believe that fairness requires distributions of reward based on merit were assessed. Similarly, evidence was reviewed bearing on the claim of psychological egoists that judgments of fairness (...) reflect a self-interested bias. Finally, Kant''s view that people should never lie was evaluated in light of evidence describing people''s actual attitudes toward lying. In all three cases, the underlying philosophical premises were concluded to be overly simplistic in view of complexities about human nature revealed in empirical research. In addition, evidence was reviewed that shed light on the teleological claims of utilitarians regarding the purported benefits of following two common organizational practices — using merit-based pay, and punishing harmdoers. Here, too, the empirical evidence (findings that these techniques do not consistently yield the greatest good for the greatest number) suggests that the premise underlying utilitarian thought is based on unfounded, overly simplistic assumptions about the effects of following various allegedly moral ideas. It is concluded that our analyses provide a useful first step toward the desired goal of business ethicists of integrating prescriptive and descriptive approaches to justice. (shrink)

An old observation about the focus sensitive particles _only_ and _even_ is that they are in some sense scalar antonyms. We examine three schematic proposals raised in the literature to capture this observation, namely that _only_ vs. _even_ presuppose that the proposition denoted by their prejacent, _p_, is lower vs. higher, respectively _(A)_ than _what is EXPECTED/the default STANDARD_ ( the ‘mirative/evaluative antonymy’ view ), _(B)_ than _SOME (salient) alternative_ in the set of contextually relevant focus alternatives, C, ( the (...) ‘existential antonymy’ view ), or _(C)_ than _ALL alternatives_ in C ( the ‘superlative antonymy’ view ). To tease these views apart, we examine the behavior of _only_ vs. _even_ in a wide range of contexts and types of discourse, concentrating on the way the C set of contextually relevant alternatives with _only_ _(C)_ _(p)_ and _even_ _(C)_ _(p)_ is constrained by the interaction of (i) previously uttered sentences and (ii) the salient QUD. Based on these examinations we argue for the preferability of the ‘superlative antonymy’ view of _only_ and _even_. In contrast, we argue that the ‘existential’ antonymy and the ‘mirative/evaluative’ antonymy between _only_ and _even_ are apparent. The former only holds in specific contexts where one alternative to _p_ is made maximally salient. As to the latter, we show that while an evaluative (‘above the standard’ / ‘a lot’) inference is hardwired into the scalar presupposition of _even_, alongside the superlative inference, the mirror imaged one (‘below the standard’ / ‘a little’) is cancellable for _only_. We propose that this inference can be derived from the interaction of the superlative scalar presupposition of _only_ and domain based constraints on alternatives in C. (shrink)

Quons are particles characterized by the parameter q, which permits smooth interpolation between Bose and Fermi statistics; q = 1 gives bosons, q = -1 gives fermions. In this paper we give a heuristic argument for an extension of conservation of statistics to quons with trilinear couplings of the form ffb, where f is fermion-like and b is boson-like. We show that q f 2 = qb. In particular, we relate the bound on qγ for photons to the bound on (...) qe for electrons, allowing the very precise bound for electrons to be carried over to photons. An extension of this argument suggests that all particles are fermions or bosons to a high precision. (shrink)

We show, relative to the base theory RCA₀: A nontrivial tree satisfies Ramsey's Theorem only if it is biembeddable with the complete binary tree. There is a class of partial orderings for which Ramsey's Theorem for pairs is equivalent to ACA₀. Ramsey's Theorem for singletons for the complete binary tree is stronger than $B\sum_{2}^{0}$ , hence stronger than Ramsey's Theorem for singletons for ω. These results lead to extensions of results, or answers to questions, of Chubb, Hirst, and McNicholl [3].

We give two new characterizations of K-triviality. We show that if for all Y such that Ω is Y-random, Ω is -random, then A is K-trivial. The other direction was proved by Stephan and Yu, giving us the first titular characterization of K-triviality and answering a question of Yu. We also prove that if A is K-trivial, then for all Y such that Ω is Y-random, ≡LRY. This answers a question of Merkle and Yu. The other direction is immediate, so (...) we have the second characterization of K-triviality.The proof of the first characterization uses a new cupping result. We prove that if A≰LRB, then for every set X there is a B-random set Y such that X is computable from Y⊕A. (shrink)

Introduction -- Invited Remarks from Symposium Participants -- What Are the Fundamental Compliance and Ethics Challenges Facing the C-Suite, and What Oversight Role Should the Board Play? -- How to Overcome the Barriers to High Standards of Integrity in the C-Suite, and What Should Boards, Management, and Policymakers Do Next? -- Appendix A: Symposium Agenda -- Appendix B: Symposium Participants -- Appendix C: Invited Keynote Address by Judge Ruben Castillo -- Appendix D: Invited Papers from Symposium Participants.

Present-day philosophy has witnessed an efflorescence of virtue ethics. Although the return to virtue has been portrayed as a rehabilitation of the notion of virtue from the neglect into which it fell in the early modern period, in his seminal article, “The Misfortunes of Virtue,” J. B. Schneewind argues that virtue’s misfortune in the early modern period was not its neglect, but rather its displacement as the central concept in ethics. In Disguised Vices, Michael Moriarty uncovers another misfortune that befell (...) virtue in the early modern period: the suspicion of the concept of virtue, that is, of its applicability to agents, in the work of early modern French philosophers, theologians, and moralists. Moriarty .. (shrink)

Review of Peter Mittelstaedt, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the Measurement Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 140pp., ISBN 0-521-55445-4, hardback US$44.95, £30.00.

Alci, Miguelzinho e Lazinho trouxeram espigas de milho, as primeiras colhidas no milharal de Ivo e Sueli, amigos e vizinhos, e Rosilene colocou na panela. Mais tarde, Alci, voltou com imensa abóbora que foi logo transformada em doce e ainda será quibebe e sopa, tudo em fogão de lenha. Neste recanto do sul de Minas, descoberto há cinco anos, conseguimos construir um pequeno refúgio. Marcia, arquiteta, decidiu que a casa teria grandes janelas e portas de vidro, abrindo para a (...) floresta, para vales e montanhas e, do lado direito, para a Pico do Papagaio, um dos símbolos de Minas Gerais. (shrink)

Informed consent is recognized as a primary ethical requirement to conduct research involving humans. In the investigations with the use of human biological material, informed consent (IC) assumes a differentiated condition on account of the many future possibilities. This work presents suitable alternatives for IC regarding the storage and use of human biological material in research, according to new Brazilian regulations. Both norms – Resolution 441/11 of the National Health Council, approved on 12 May 2011, and Ordinance 2.201 (NATIONAL GUIDELINES (...) FOR BIOREPOSITORIES AND BIOBANKS OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL FOR RESEARCH PURPOSE) of the Brazil Ministry of Health, approved on 14 September 2011 – state that the consent of subjects for the collection, storage and use of samples stored in Biobanks is necessarily established by means of a Free and Informed Consent Form (ICF). In order to obtain individual and formal statements, this form should contain the following two mutually exclusive options: an explanation about the use of the stored material in each research study, and the need for new consent or the waiver thereof when the material is used for a new study. On the other hand, ICF suitable for Biorepositories must be exclusive and related to specific research. Although Brazilian and international regulations identify the main aspects to be included in the IC, efforts are still necessary to improve the consent process, so that the document will become a bond of trust between subject and researcher. (shrink)